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THE YOUNGEST SEMI-INDEPENDENT STATE IN EUROPE
Kosovo as international problem separate from that of Albania was initially created in 1913 on the 
ruins of the Ottoman Empire when the Kingdom of Serbia conquered and occupied the land with an 
Albanian majority. Between 1918 and 1999, Kosovo had been part and a nagging security problem 
of three multinational Yugoslavias. Th e kernel of the problem was in the political confl ict between 
the Kosovar Albanians’ striving for national emancipation and self-determination and the Serbian 
elites’ strenuous endeavours for rule in Kosovo. Kosovo’s forceful separation from Serbia was eff ected 
in 1999 by NATO’s military intervention. By 2008 it was followed by Kosovo’s proclamation of inde-
pendence. Th e new semi-independent state has remained however a less than universally recognized 
member of the international community. Refs 24.
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Proclaimed independent in February 2008 the Republic of Kosovo resulted from a 
relatively long standing confl ict between several Serbian and Yugoslav states and a part 
of the Albanian nation. Th is confl ict has not been however from a time immemorial. In 
the famous battle at Kosovo Polje (1389), which proved to be fateful for the medieval 
Serbian state, Albanian tribesmen fought against the Ottomans on the side of the Serbian 
king Lazar. Later the competitions for land, confl ictual attitudes and interests developed 
steadily on the territory of Kosovo over four and a half centuries of Ottoman rule. Th e 
Islamization of the majority of Albanians deepened the existing cultural divide, adding 
the religions divide to the wider language divide between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. 
Th e latter as Muslims enjoyed privileges and favors from Ottoman rulers while the former 
suff ered discrimination. Th e Ottomans had on many occasions used Kosovar Albanians 
as allies in suppressing Serbian revolts and uprisings. All these circumstances increased 
the element of confl ict in the mixture of relations between the two ethnic communities, 
which had for several centuries included also peaceful coexistence, and cooperation at the 
local level [1, pp. 45–76].
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Th e elements of confl ict gained momentum with the growth of Serbian and Albanian 
nationalism in the second half of the 20th century and with the waning of Ottoman impe-
rial rule in the Balkans. At the turn of the 20th century, the destiny of Kosovo constituted 
only a small part of the Oriental question and a subchapter in the Albanian national ques-
tion. Several decades earlier Kosovo had found itself at the intersection of competing in-
terests of great European powers and of four confl icting regional national projects. Each 
of them implied overlapping and confl icting territorial aspirations. Th e Serbian national 
project has included since, at least, 1844 the inclusion of the whole of Kosovo into the 
Serbian state. Th e Montenegrin project had been directed towards acquiring Western Ko-
sovo (Metohija), while the Bulgarian project aimed at a part of Eastern Kosovo. Th e all-
Albanian national project was adopted by the League of Prizren in Kosovo, in November 
1878. It obviously included also Kosovo as part of a desired autonomous Albanian entity 
within the Ottoman Empire.
Kosovo as Serbia’s war booty and nagging problem
As a sharp clash between the Serbian state and the community of Kosovar Albani-
ans the confl ict exploded about a century ago during the First Balkan War (1912–1913). 
Th e governments of the Kingdoms of Montenegro and of Serbia [2, pp. 7, 13–14] had 
then as their key geostrategic ambitions territorial expansion into Ottoman possessions 
and an unimpeded permanent territorial access to the Mediterranean Sea. Th e annexa-
tion of what is now the Northern part of the Republic Albania and of its sea port Durres 
(Serb. Drač) [2, pp. 94–110] would have made Serbia a maritime nation. Th e conquest of 
Shkoder (Serb. Skadar) and of the fertile land in the estuary of the Bojana River would 
have very considerably expanded the territory of Montenegro and made it economically 
more viable. 
At the time of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, 
Serbia tried to entice the Russian Empire to join in undertaking a military counteraction. 
Following Russia’s refusal, the Serbian government waited for another chance to gain ter-
ritory at the expense of Ottoman possessions in the Balkans, including those with Serbian 
minorities only or even without a Serbian population. Th e much smaller Kingdom of 
Montenegro followed the same expansionist line. Th e Russian Empire in its competition 
with the Austro-Hungarian Empire for infl uence in the Balkans had actively encouraged 
and supported the territorial ambitions of Serbia, Montenegro and other predominantly 
Christian Orthodox states. Russian diplomacy initiated secret meetings of these states’ 
representatives from which an interstate conspiracy developed. Aware of and hostile to the 
Albanians’ strivings for national self-assertion and emancipation the governments of Ser-
bia, Greece and Montenegro secretly plotted to occupy and partition Ottoman possessions 
with a predominantly or entirely Albanian and Muslim population. Th e conspirators’ clear 
intention was to preempt the appearance of an Islamic state on the ruins of the “Sublime 
Porte” in the Balkans [3, pp. 56–60].
In October 1912, according to coordinated war plans, the Montenegrin army fi rst 
and soon aft erwards the Serbian army invaded and quickly conquered territories in what 
is today Northern Albania. By the end of October 1912 the Montenegrin army “liberated” 
Western Kosovo (Metohija) and on November 4 entered Djakovica, simultaneously with 
the Serbian army. Th e Serbian conquest of Kosovo was then only a secondary objective 
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while the ‘liberation’ of Kosovo’s medieval Christian monuments and of its Serbian minor-
ity from ‘Ottoman bondage’ served as a convenient propaganda cover internally and for 
the international community [2, p. 119].
Th e Serbian government claimed that its right to occupy Kosovo was justifi ed (1) by 
the Serbs’ superior level of civilization compared with that of the Albanians’, (2) by the 
Serbian state’s historic possession of the province in the 13th to 15th centuries and (3) by 
the numerical majority then enjoyed by the Serbs’ Slavic ancestors. By modern standards 
however all three arguments have long since become unacceptable as justifi cation for ag-
gressive behaviour against a neighbouring state. Serbia then grossly violated the principle 
of territorial integrity of a neighbouring state when its armed forces attacked and occupied 
Kosovo. Th e Sublime Porte and its legal successor the Republic of Turkey never recog-
nized the cession of Kosovo and no corresponding international treaty was concluded. 
Th us Serbia’s occupation of Kosovo was illegal and also illegitimate since Serbia carried 
it out against the will of its majority Albanian population. Th e Serbian military conquest 
was accompanied by grave violations of international humanitarian law and caused about 
25,000 deaths among Albanian Kosovars and Turks. Th e atrocities against Kosovo’s civil-
ian population were vividly described by Leon Trotsky (then a Russian correspondent in 
the Balkans) and were thoroughly documented by an international commission of en-
quiry [4].
Th e attainment of the ultimate Serbian and Montenegrin strategic objectives was 
however foiled then by Austro-Hungary (and Italy) who resisted Russia’s and its proxies’ 
penetration into the Adriatic. Th e Russian imperial command felt that Russia was still 
insuffi  ciently prepared for a major war. Th e Serbian government consequently bowed to 
an Austro-Hungarian war ultimatum. Th e Serbian Army was ordered to withdraw from 
Northern Albania. Montenegro persisted longer but by May 1913  its troops were also 
forced to leave Shkoder. However the European powers (Great Britain, Austro-Hungary, 
Germany, France and Italy) at a conference in London, at Russia’s insistence, agreed to 
accord Serbia and Montenegro occupied Kosovo, Sandzak and Vardar Macedonia as war 
booties. In 1912–1913 Kosovo was not even properly legally annexed to Serbia, according 
to the valid Serbian constitution of 1903 and later to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes according to its ‘Vidovdan’ constitution.
Th e European powers thus knowingly allowed Serbia to keep Kosovo occupied 
against the wishes of its majority population. Th e host of the London conference, British 
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey frankly admitted this fact during a debate in the House 
of Commons. Like Cyprus and several Arab lands Kosovo was then forcefully amputated 
from the Ottoman Empire and immediately subjected to another foreign rule. Th e Otto-
man possessions in the Near East and North Africa were subjugated by France, Great Brit-
ain and Italy [5, pp. 71–76], while Kosovo became de facto annexed by small Montenegro 
and Serbia. Th e Kingdom of Serbia, which only several decades earlier became liberated 
of Ottoman rule, was thus allowed by the European great powers to create its own mini-
colonial empire in the Balkans. In November 1918 Montenegro lost its sovereignty, ruling 
royal dynasty, and its very name. Together with Western Kosovo (Metohija) it became 
absorbed by the Kingdom of Serbia before being included by fi at into the “Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenians”. 
Th e two brutal Serbian conquests of Kosovo in 1912 and again in 1918 left  a bitter im-
print on the collective memory of the Kosovar Albanians. Th e subsequent harsh Serbian 
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rule under the Karadjordjevic dynasty was also so painful that in April 1941 the Kosovar 
Albanians massively greeted the invading Italian and German troops as liberators. During 
the Second World War the largest part of Kosovo was occupied by Italy and incorporated 
into the satellite ‘Kingdom of Albania’ with the Italian king as head of state. Th e rest of Ko-
sovo was then divided between the “Th ird Reich” and Bulgaria, the latter having annexed 
its occupation zone in Eastern Kosovo. Th e Italian, German and Bulgarian policies of oc-
cupation crisscrossed and partly overlapped in Kosovo. On the other hand, the Yugoslav 
and Albanian resistance and liberation movements, dominated by the Communists, made 
their tangible inroads into Kosovo only from 1943. Prior to the Italian capitulation in 
September 1943, only very few Kosovar Albanians joined the Communist-led resistance. 
Th e Kosovo National Liberation Council which met at its fi rst session at Bujane in January 
2, 1944 adopted a resolution according to which Kosovo aft er the war would be reunited 
with Albania [6, p. 34].
Th e third conquest (‘liberation’) of Kosovo by Serbian units of the Yugoslav Army in 
autumn 1944 was again accompanied by armed violence against the Kosovar Albanians. 
Th e act of absorption of Kosovo into Yugoslavia was passed in April 1945 under the condi-
tions of martial law, by an appointed ‘Kosmet Regional People’s Assembly’. Th e composi-
tion of the Assembly was utterly unrepresentative consisting of 142 appointed members, 
among them only 33 Kosovar Albanians. All appointed deputies were Communists and 
mostly Serbs. Th e latter represented then only about 20 % of Kosovo’s population. Th e an-
nexation was adopted by acclamation, without a vote and without a single speech, let alone 
a debate. Th ere was no preceding election or a referendum in Kosovo [7, pp. 315–316]. 
Th is Stalinist parody of legality thus totally lacked democratic legitimacy. 
Talks related to the future post-war status of Kosovo took place since 1944 between 
the leaderships of the Yugoslav and Albanian communist parties. Aft er the war Soviet, 
Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Albanian communist leaders discussed, on a number of occa-
sions and behind closed doors, a project of a Balkan Federation. In 1947–48 this project 
became one of the controversies, which contributed to the Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel and 
was subsequently abandoned [8, pp. 39–41].
Kosovo as Yugoslavia’s thorny problem
Between 1918 and 1999 Kosovo remained part of three multinational Yugoslavias, for 
most of the time as a non-self-governing province subordinate to the Serbian offi  cialdom 
in Belgrade. Th e overt political discrimination of non-Slavic national groups was built 
into the very foundation of the fi rst Yugoslavia since its inception in 1918, named symbol-
ically the ‘Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians’ only. Between 1919 and 1941 the 
treatment of the Yugoslav Albanians, in majority Moslems, had been much worse than 
that of the German, Hungarian and other Christian minorities. In the communist-ruled 
second Yugoslavia (FPRY, SFRY) the Kosovar Albanians’ position had improved consider-
ably compared with that under the wartime monarchy. However, contrary to the Yugoslav 
communists’ belief and their public pronouncements, ‘the socialist revolution’ did not re-
solve numerous national questions in that multinational state, the Kosovar Albanian one 
included. Th e Kosovar Albanians’ situation had been adversely aff ected by the Tito-Stalin 
confl ict and by Albania’s participation in hostile actions against Yugoslavia, including bor-
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der incidents. Th ese actions had given a pretext for harsh repression in Kosovo, which was 
relaxed aft er the dismissal of Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966.
Th e Kosovo problem in all three Yugoslavias had contained at its kernel a political 
confl ict between the Kosovar Albanians’ desire for national emancipation and self-deter-
mination [6, pp. 41–50] and, on the other hand, the Serbian elites’ strenuous endeavours 
to rule Kosovo. As a result of general liberalization of Yugoslavia’s political system, in 
1963 Kosovo had gained a higher measure of internal autonomy and the enhanced legal 
status of an Autonomous Province. 
Furthermore, with the adoption in 1974 of the last SFRY constitution, Kosovo be-
came an almost full-fl edged member of the federation. Th e Autonomous Province of Ko-
sovo had been, according to the last SFRY constitution of 1974 an integral part of the 
Yugoslav federation. It was represented in its collective Presidency and in other federal 
institutions on an equal footing and in many respects enjoyed equal rights with the six 
republics, including Serbia. By then the Kosovar Albanians became the third largest eth-
nicity in Yugoslavia (aft er the Serbs and Croats). Th is demographic change and the liberal 
evolution in Yugoslav politics made politically untenable the Kosovar Albanians’ obvious 
inequality in rights with a Slavic nation that was several times smaller, the neighbouring 
Montenegrins. However the Kosovar Albanians’ desire for full equality in collective rights 
with Yugoslavia’s Slavic nations, if granted and implemented, would have, among other 
things, put into question Yugoslavia’s very name (‘Th e Land of the Southern Slavs’), its 
anthem (‘Hey, Slavs’), the privileged legal status of Slavs, and the existing power relations 
and the Belgrade bureaucracy’s pivotal position in the federal state. 
As a constant source of political and security troubles, Kosovo tangibly contributed 
in 1941, 1991 and 2003 to the dissolution of all three Yugoslavias: the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia (KY), the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY). Th e dismantling of the SFRJ started when on March 28, 1989 the 
Serbian People’s Assembly eff ectively abolished Kosovo’s autonomy. By adopting consti-
tutional amendments the Serbian parliament subjected the province to direct rule from 
Belgrade. Th e Provincial Assembly of Kosovo was disbanded by the Serbian Assembly on 
July 5, 1990. Th is action was accompanied by brutal police intimidation and numerous 
arrests of Kosovar Albanian deputies in the Provincial Assembly, buttressed visibly by the 
presence of JNA tanks in the streets of Pristina1. Kosovo’s subjugated majority population 
had been exposed to outright discrimination and harsh treatment by the Serbian police 
and Serbian courts. By its unilateral action and by severe anti-Albanian repression the 
Serbian government gravely undermined the Yugoslav constitutional order. It raised not 
entirely unfounded fears in Croatia and Slovenia that the Serbian leadership, aligned with 
the federal military, would attempt subsequently to undertake similar actions elsewhere 
in Yugoslavia. Th e repression in Kosovo consequently badly soared Serbia’s relations with 
Croatia and Slovenia and deepened the boiling Yugoslav crisis. 
Th e sinister events in Kosovo in 1988–89 had taken place in the already shaky fed-
eral state while outside Yugoslavia’s borders a political upheaval swept Eastern Europe. 
Th e massive geopolitical change on the continent had accelerated the demise of the 
1 JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) was the federal armed forces in the second Yugoslavia, which disin-
tegrated in 1991–92. In 1992 JNA’s remnants were legally reorganized into the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) and 
the armies of the Serbian secessionist para-states in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Aft er the separa-
tion in 2006 the Army of Yugoslavia was divided into the armies of Serbia and Montenegro.
72  Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 6. Политология. Международные отношения. 2016. Вып. 3
a uthoritarian communist regime in the SFR Yugoslavia as well. Th e crisis in Kosovo was 
followed soon by armed violence in Croatia’s Serbian Kraina instigated from Belgrade. By 
1991–1992 the ultranationalist policy of the Milosevic regime, supported by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and by majority public opinion among the Serbs, ruined the second 
Yugoslavia and the achievements of the Serbian national project from 1918. In the follow-
ing 17 years the Yugoslav federal state created by the Communists in 1945 disintegrated 
into seven separate states. 
Kosovo as an issue of international politics since the 1990s
As long as the second Yugoslavia existed, Kosovo represented predominantly an in-
ternal problem in Yugoslavia. Only occasionally was this issue was raised by neighbouring 
Albania. Th e repression and blatant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in Kosovo had thus long gone on unopposed by the Council of Europe and other interna-
tional organizations, largely because Kosovo was regarded as an internal aff air of a sover-
eign state. Th e breakdown of SFRY, to which the confl ict in and over Kosovo substantively 
contributed, had had, however, appreciable wider international reverberations and impli-
cations. It attracted exceptional international attention and raised serious worries among 
the Western powers about its domino eff ect on ex-Soviet space. Due to this fear (which 
turned out to be highly exaggerated) the Yugoslav drama was catapulted to the top rank of 
acute international problems.
Th e Kosovo problem surfaced as a distinct and contentions international issue only 
when it became clear to the Western powers that the pacifi cation of the ex-Yugoslav space 
would be incomplete without resolving it as well. In spring 1997, aft er the forceful imposi-
tion of peace on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo problem was fi nally explicitly raised 
in several international fora, including the UN and the OSCE. However all attempts by 
the Western powers to reach a satisfactory peaceful solution through bilateral talks with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), diplomatic pressure and clear military threats 
brought no desirable results. Th e fi nal failure of these eff orts at an international conference 
at Rambouillet, France was followed in March 1999 by the fi rst armed attack by NATO 
against a UN member state. Th e FRY fi led then a complaint against the NATO members’ 
‘illegal use of force’. Th e International Court of Justice rejected the motion and declined to 
examine the legality of NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ [9].
Already prior to the NATO intervention the Milosevic regime decided to exploit a 
“historic” opportunity and to get rid for good of most Albanian and other Muslim popu-
lation of Kosovo. Th e displacement of about 350,000 Kosovar Albanians, Turks and other 
non-Serbs was carried out by the Yugoslav Army and by the militarized Serbian police 
already in summer 1998. Th e beginning of NATO air attacks in March 1999 was followed 
by a still more massive wave of terror and of organized mass expulsion of Kosovar Alba-
nians and Turks to Macedonia and Albania. Th e Serbian regime’s attempted act of geno-
cide provided legitimacy to NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ [10, pp. 115–128] as an 
expression of the ‘responsibility to protect’ [11, pp. 535–539; 12] Kosovo’s civilian popula-
tion. A small group of NATO member states participated in the operation directly while a 
half dozen other members indirectly. Like earlier in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo 
problem would not have been even half-resolved without a determined military action by 
USA and NATO.
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Th e Operation Allied Force raised Kosovo to the rank of burning international 
problems. Th is intervention, undertaken without a UN Security Council’s authorization, 
resulted in the second foreign occupation, aft er Bosnia & Herzegovina, of a part of ex-
SFRY’s territory. Under the terms of the Kumanovo protocol signed with NATO in June 
1999 FRY/Serbia removed from Kosovo its army, police and civilian administration. Th us 
in summer 1999 FRY/Serbia lost three key elements of sovereignty in Kosovo: the con-
trol over its territory, its population and borders. Th e NATO peace-enforcing interven-
tion physically detached Kosovo from Serbia and placed the province under temporary 
UN administration (‘UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’ (UNMIK)). Aft er 
the retreat of the Yugoslav army, Serbian police and civilian administration from Kosovo, 
international organizations, notably the UN High Commissariat for Refugees and the In-
ternational Migration Organization, undertook a large scale operation of humanitarian 
assistance. During the second half of 1999 about 1.3 million refugees and displaced Al-
banian Kosovars and Turks returned to their homes in Kosovo [13; 14; 15]. Th ey found 
mostly ruined and burnt-out homesteads without roofs, vandalized and oft en mined 
houses, apartments, schools and other public buildings.
With the adoption of the seminal UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 
1999, Kosovo became an international protectorate with various security, surveillance, 
control, assistance and other roles played by several international organizations (UN, 
NATO, OSCE, EU, Council of Europe, World Bank etc.) [16]. 
Resolution 1244, inter alia, established UNMIK and the international military pres-
ence in the form of the NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR). At its height in 2001 UNMIK was 
the largest civilian peacekeeping mission to date in the history of the United Nations. It 
consisted of over ten thousand international staff  and local staff ers. UNMIK was tasked 
with organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for demo-
cratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement and transferring 
its administrative responsibilities, as these institutions would be created. Initially UNMIK 
established the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) consisting of Pristina-based 
administrative departments for delivery of services and revenue collection as well as lo-
cal administrations and councils at the municipal level. Th e Police service had been then 
a solely UNMIK responsibility. Since that high point, the competencies of UNMIK were 
gradually reduced. Th e role and the size of the UNMIK Police has been correspondingly 
steadily fallen from the initial high of about 4,700  to only six policemen in 2014. Th is 
reduction has been due to the development of Kosovo self-governing institutions and the 
presence and activities of other international organizations. 
Th e NATO-led force KFOR at the time of its deployment in summer 1999  was 
composed of nearly 50,000 troops, provided by 19 NATO members and 19 non-NATO 
members. Th e territory of Kosovo was divided then into fi ve zones of responsibility with 
lead-contingents provided by the USA, UK, France, Italy and Turkey. Th e Russian Federa-
tion endeavoured to obtain its own zone of responsibility but was refused by the Western 
powers who feared a repetition of a Transnistria-like Serbian secession under Russian 
protection. Russian units were deployed in several KFOR zones, including the U. S.-led 
zone of responsibility on the south-eastern periphery of Kosovo. One Russian company 
had participated in joint U. S./Russian vehicular patrols along the border with Macedonia. 
Russia withdrew its contingent from KFOR in June 2003, handing over the facilities it had 
occupied to the local Kosovo Serbs rather than to UNMIK which was the legal admin-
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istrator. KFOR’s original tasks were defi ned as (a) deterring renewed hostilities; (b) de-
militarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); (c) establishing a secure environment; 
(d)  ensuring public safety and order; (e)  supervising demining; (f)  conducting border 
monitoring; (g)  ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of all international 
organizations. Eff ectively KFOR has undertaken control of Kosovo’s external borders, air-
space, key communication channels as well as the protection of Serbian religious monu-
ments and enclaves. Since then the numbers of soldiers and of contributory nations were 
steadily reduced. Th is process was temporarily interrupted in March 2004 as a reaction to 
an outburst of interethnic violence and later resumed. 
Th e OSCE Mission in Kosovo has operated under the mandate of UNSC Resolution 
1244 and the decision of the OSCE Permanent Council from July 1999. It has been the 
largest OSCE fi eld operation running a wide range of activities: developing democratic 
institutions and civil society, promoting human rights and the rule of law, organizing fi ve 
rounds of elections, helping the Central Election Commission, assisting the Assembly of 
Kosovo and other public institutions, monitoring the work of Kosovo institutions, provid-
ing training of public offi  cials, developing an independent media environment etc. Th e 
Mission has employed some 550 people in its various units and around 2,330 in its fi eld 
operations.
Th e European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was estab-
lished in February 2008, started operating in December 2008, and by May 2010 comprised 
2,814 staff  (1,717 international staff  and 1,097 local staff ). It has been supported by the 
28 EU member states and fi ve contributing non-member states. Th e Executive Division 
of EULEX investigates, prosecutes and adjudicates sensitive criminal cases, while the 
Strengthening Division monitors, mentors and advises local counterparts in the Kosovo 
police, judiciary and customs service.
Th e government of Serbia had maintained on its own territory a ‘Ministry for Kosovo 
and Metohija’, outposts of Serbia’s ministries, security organs, customs and tax authorities, 
postal services, courts, extraterritorial offi  ces of the Kosovo municipalities located to the 
South of the Ibar River etc. It has exercised a considerable measure of control through its 
proxies over the predominantly Serbian municipalities in the North of Kosovo and in the 
enclaves to the South of the Ibar River. 
Kosovo’s proclamation of independence and its present status
Legally Kosovo has remained under the UN authority, although this UN role became 
a legal fi ction. A system of multilevel governance combined with international protector-
ate over Kosovo operated offi  cially for about twelve years (1999–2012).
All Serbian and former Yugoslav laws became invalid on its territory, most legal ar-
chives and other administrative documentation have been missing (evacuated to Serbia 
proper) while the new UNMIK legislation was widely incomplete, resulting in a legal lim-
bo in most of Kosovo. 
Th e model of Kosovo’s enhanced autonomy with Serbia had been for several years a 
solution preferred by Western powers. However the psychological fallout of Serbian re-
pression in 1988–1991 and of the armed confl ict in 1999 made its application politically 
impossible. Th e former President of Finland Marti Ahtisaari’s ‘Comprehensive Proposal 
for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ commissioned by the UN Secretary General was sub-
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mitted to the UN Security Council in March 2007. Its key recommendation reads ‘Kosovo 
is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other 
unresolved confl icts’ [17, p. 4]. Th e Ahtisaari plan envisaged an internationally supervised 
(and thus limited) independence for Kosovo, with its distinct national symbols, the right 
to conclude international treaties and to seek membership in international organizations. 
Kosovo had to provide high level protection of the rights of national minorities and ad-
ditional security for the Serbian Orthodox Church. Th e international community were to 
supervise, monitor and have all necessary powers to ensure eff ective and effi  cient imple-
mentation of the confl ict settlement. However the adoption of Ahtisaari’s blueprint was 
blocked by the Russian Federation and by the People’s Republic of China.
Aft er considerable vacillation the Western members of the Contact group (USA, 
Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy) had by 2007  concluded that the restoration 
of even only formal Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo would be totally politically unac-
ceptable to and violently resisted by its majority Albanian population. Hence Kosovo’s 
limited and supervised independence was considered to be the least objectionable among 
all available alternatives. Th e acute international problem was then only formally resolved. 
Th e proclamation of Kosovo’s independence on February 18, 2008 ex-post facto legalized, 
by an internal act, Kosovo’s previous de facto detachment from Serbia. In its VIIIth princi-
ple, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 allowed for a peaceful change of state borders on the ba-
sis of democratically expressed self-determination. Th e Kosovo proclamation had indeed 
been preceded by several referenda and was carried out in a peaceful, orderly and civilized 
manner. Th e only acts of violence were committed then by the protesting Serbs, mostly in 
Serbia proper. Although the act of proclamation was carried out without an a uthorization 
by the UN Security Council, this body has not subsequently annulled Kosovo’s independ-
ence, as Serbia demanded. Th e Kosovo proclamation has presumably completed the al-
most two decades’ long dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia. Similarly as the neighbouring Al-
bania in 1912–1913 Kosovo was emancipated with the explicit support of Western powers 
and against the stiff  opposition by Serbia, supported on both occasions by Russia.
Th e Belgrade government angrily responded to Kosovo’s declaration not only by an 
offi  cial refusal to acknowledge its independence but also by closing Serbia’s borders to 
trade with Kosovo. During demonstrations in Belgrade the Kostunica government more 
than tolerated the mob violence against several foreign embassies, accompanied by down-
town looting and arson. Serbia also temporarily recalled its ambassadors from most states 
which recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Th e latter action was a Serbian vari-
ation of the Hallstein doctrine which was applied in the past by the Federal Republic of 
Germany to punish selectively some states which recognized and established diplomatic 
relations with the German Democratic Republic. 
Following Kosovo’s proclamation of independence the government of Serbia started 
an action which initially looked as a shrewd diplomatic manoeuvre. Its immediate politi-
cal objective was to mollify Serbian public opinion, to gain time and slow down the pro-
cess of Kosovo’s international recognition. In early October 2008 the Serbian delegation 
succeeded in obtaining an UN General Assembly’s resolution demanding ICJ’s advisory 
opinion on the accordance of Kosovo’s ‘unilateral declaration of independence’ with inter-
national law [18]. Serbian diplomacy however unwisely formulated the request. Namely, 
declarations of independence are facts which concern the internal constitutional and po-
litical orders of states. International law is mute on this subject, neither permitting nor 
76  Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 6. Политология. Международные отношения. 2016. Вып. 3
prohibiting such declarations. In addition, the declaration was not really an unilateral act 
by Kosovo as its substance, wording and very timing were coordinated beforehand with 
the fi ve Western members of the Contact group, including three permanent members of 
the UN Security Council. By adopting this document Kosovo only declared its intention 
to gain independence, voluntarily accepted numerous limitations of its sovereignty and 
did not in fact become an independent state.
According to the submitted Serbian statement [19] the presumed illegality of the Ko-
sovo declaration resulted from:
1. its violation of the principle of the respect for the territorial integrity of states;
2. the inapplicability of the principle of self-determination to Kosovo; and 
3. its violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (which presumably af-
fi rmed Serbia’s continuous sovereignty over Kosovo).
It took ICJ about a year and a half to decide on the UN General Assembly’s request. 
Th e ICJ opinion was expected to fall somewhere between the two opposite sets of argu-
ments satisfying fully neither of the two sides. Having examined the statements on the 
subject submitted by 32 states the International Court of Justice delivered its non-binding 
advisory opinion on July 22, 2010 [9]. Th e Court surprised many observers by its conclu-
sion adopted by the strong majority of ten to four votes. Following the procedural decision 
to limit its task to strict consideration of the submitted request the Court avoided dealing 
with wider issues of external self-determination which were raised in Serbia’s submission, 
in the comments by Kosovo and by other states. Within this narrow legal framework the 
ICJ straightforwardly determined that the declaration of Kosovo’s independence did not 
violate the norms of general international law, the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Con-
stitutional Framework enacted by the UN Interim Administration. Th e ICJ intentionally 
avoided to pronounce on or imply the legality and legitimacy of all declarations of inde-
pendence. Very importantly, the ICJ did not base its opinion on the right to self-determi-
nation and did not at all deal with the question of Kosovo’s international recognition. Th e 
Court has been criticized for having missed the opportunity to clarify a hotly contentious 
issue in international law [20, pp. 135–144]. Th e political eff ects of the ICJ decision were 
however immediately and abundantly clear: a painful defeat for Serbian diplomacy and a 
vindication of Kosovo’s position. 
Since summer 1999, Kosovo has developed a parliamentary political system separate 
from Serbia, a free market economy and adopted a diff erent currency (the Euro). Th e eco-
nomic, social and political situation in Kosovo has appreciably improved since separation 
from Serbia in 1999. It was largely due to international assistance (around 21 % GNP) and 
to the Kosovars’ remittances from abroad (roughly 15 % of GNP). However the Pristina 
government still lacks control over Kosovo’s entire territory, borders and population. Th e 
country has defi cient economic viability, suff ers from excessive external fi nancial depend-
ence and has been burdened by the region-wide problems of corruption, illegal traffi  cking 
and organized crime. A number of Kosovo’s burning political and social problems have re-
mained unresolved. Poverty (about 50 % of the population) and very high unemployment 
(about 45 % generally and about 75 % among the females and the young) [21, pp. 17–22], 
poor governance, malfunctioning rule of law and the obstacles to free travel pose daunting 
problems to Kosovo’s majority population.
While refl ecting the benevolent involvement and good will by the international com-
munity the multilevel system of governance in Kosovo had proven to be too cumbersome, 
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confusing and rather ineff ective in providing for the normalization of inter-ethnic rela-
tions and for healthy social and economic progress in Kosovo. On 10 September 2012 the 
International Steering Group for Kosovo offi  cially terminated the supervision of Kosovo’s 
limited independence and closed the Offi  ce of the International Civilian Representative. 
However these symbolic acts have so far brought only moderate change in the real func-
tioning of international tutelage over Kosovo. Its entire system is comprised at present of 
over 7,000 international military, police and civilian personnel, without counting the for-
eign diplomatic personnel also involved in overseeing Kosovo and, at least, two thousand 
persons of local staff . A reduced Contact Group consisting of fi ve Western ambassadors, 
supplemented by the EU Special Representative has reportedly held regular, weekly meet-
ings with members of the Kosovo government.
Th e continuation of the UN mission (UNMIK) in its present form and size of 130 in-
ternational staff  has remained highly questionable in view of its greatly reduced scope of 
activities and of importance. At least its renaming and redefi nition of tasks have been long 
overdue. Any substantive reduction, let alone discontinuation of UNMIK, and a recom-
mendation by the Security Council to the UN General Assembly to admit Kosovo as a 
member state have been prevented by the likelihood of the Russian Federation and China 
exercising their veto power in the matter. EULEX has been, so far, the biggest, presently 
about 1,200-strong EU mission in the framework of the EU Common Security and De-
fence Policy. Th e EU mission’s results in fi ghting wide-spread corruption and organized 
crime in Kosovo have been meagre and hardly commensurable with the annual invest-
ment of over €110 million in its functioning. Th e EULEX mandate was however extend-
ed by two years. KFOR’s present strength of under 5,000 soldiers, provided by 31 NATO 
members and non-members, and its tasks have been under regular review by the North 
Atlantic Council.
By March 2016 Kosovo has been offi  cially recognized by 112 member states of the 
Organization of United Nations. Included into this tally are three permanent members of 
UN Security Council, more than two thirds of the Council of Europe’ membership and all 
Kosovo’s immediate neighbours and all former Yugoslav republics with the exceptions of 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Th is evolution allowed for Kosovo’s membership in 
some international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank and in several regional bodies. However so long as Serbia maintains its opposition 
and the Russian Federation (fi rmly) and the People’s Republic of China (more fl exibly) 
support Serbia’s position, Kosovo cannot gain a seat in the Organization of United Nations 
and to enter such bodies as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
Council of Europe and others. Although Kosovo’s existence has been protected by inter-
national forces and its political survival secured, this newcomer in the family of European 
nations remains an incomplete structure and an ‘unfi nished state’ [22, pp. 111–120]. 
Relations between Kosovo and Serbia
Th e confl ictual relations between Serbia and Kosovo have been symbolically refl ected 
in the diff erent ways the latter is offi  cially called. When Kosovo became a single admin-
istrative unit in 1945, aft er its annexation into the second Yugoslavia (FPRY) it was given 
a double offi  cial name ‘Kosovo and Metokhia’. Since the Albanian Kosovars have rejected 
its second half as smacking of colonialism, the shortened single word designation was 
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adopted in 1963. It refl ected the enhanced status of an autonomous province within Ser-
bia. When in 1989 Kosovo’s autonomy was de facto abolished by the Serbian regime under 
Slobodan Milosevic the double-word name was correspondingly and symbolically rein-
stated by Belgrade. Th e present fi rst constitutional name of the land is Kosova with the 
Serbian variation Kosovo as the offi  cial second name. Th e state authorities in Serbia and 
defi ant members and organizations of the Serbian minority in Kosovo however still use 
the double name while other states and international organizations utilize the one-word 
name Kosovo or Kosova. 
Th e detachment and “loss” of Kosovo caused a painful psychological, political and 
existential trauma to its Serbian minority and continues to produce diffi  cult problems to 
over a hundred thousand Serbian and Roma refugees in Serbia proper. For Serbia Kosovo 
has represented a problem of psychological and political readjustment, a fi nancial “black 
hole” of several hundred million Euros annually, a considerable source of illegal smug-
gling and of organized crime (oft en related to drugs). 
Th e UN General Assembly’s resolution of September 2010 offi  cially sponsored jointly 
by Serbia and the 27 EU members paved the way to a dialogue between Belgrade and 
Pristina on practical matters, under the auspices of the European Union [23]. While Ko-
sovo has sought recognition and the establishment of normal relations with Serbia the 
former Prime Minister and at former Foreign Minister and current Foreign Minister Ivica 
Dačić had advocated a “readjustment” of borders. It would detach from Kosovo the area 
of around 1000 sq. km to the North of the Ibar River with four municipalities (Mitrovica 
North, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic) and up to 40 thousand Serbs. Th e Western 
powers, on the other hand, stand fi rmly by the principle of maintaining the internal bor-
ders between the former federal units of ex-Yugoslavia, including those of the two autono-
mous provinces. Th ey reject redrawing of any of them for the concern that it would open 
a Pandora’s box of territorial revendication elsewhere in the ex-Yugoslav space. Secondly, 
it is realistically feared that the detachment of Northern Kosovo would unleash a mass 
exodus from the Serbian enclaves to the South of the Ibar River and decimate the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo. 
Another conceivable solution of the confl ict has been suggested: a condominium in 
Northern Kosovo, resembling the Good Friday agreement between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom over Ulster. Pristina has rejected any power sharing arrangements between Ko-
sovo and Serbia or a tripartite power sharing arrangement with EU as they would compro-
mise Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity. In addition a condominium would 
open the question of the adjacent Presevo-Bujanovac area in Southern Serbia which his-
torically used to be part of Kosovo. Th is area has been predominantly inhabited by ethnic 
Albanians. Th e last census for the area gave the fi gures of about 57 thousand Albanian 
residents who constituted close to 90 percent of the total population in the Presevo munic-
ipality and about 55 percent in the Bujanovac municipality. Th e present absolute fi gures 
and percentages of the Albanians are probably still higher. In 1992 in an unoffi  cial refer-
endum about 95 percent of Albanian residents voted for unifi cation with Kosovo [24, p. 2].
Th e overcoming of obstacles on the thorny road of reconciliation and accommoda-
tion between the two states has been eased greatly by Serbia’s desire to obtain the status 
of a candidate country, to open pre-admission negotiations and eventually to join the Eu-
ropean Union. Th e subterranean evolution of Serbian public opinion has allowed former 
Serbian ultranationalists, notably the current President Tomislav Nikolić, Prime Minister 
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Aleksandar Vučić and Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dačić to radically change the course 
and to admit the “loss” of Kosovo. Responding to the European Union’s pressure and in-
ducements Serbia agreed in 2010 to start bilateral talks with Kosovo on outstanding prac-
tical problems. Since March 2011 they had been conducted under the EU auspices at the 
level of Prime Ministers and. Serbia’s government took a positive step in August 2012 and 
stopped boycotting regional gatherings at which Kosovo was also present. Six rounds of 
talks in Brussels resulted by April 2013 in the conclusion of several agreements on nor-
malization of relations without however Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent 
state. 
On the basis of these agreements a de facto self-governing Community of Serbian Mu-
nicipalities was to be created in Northern Kosovo, integrated into Kosovo’s constitutional 
and legal system as well as a Northern police region. Th e agreements obliged Serbia to dis-
solve its concealed security structure in Kosovo and to integrate Serbian policemen in the 
North into the Kosovo police force. Th ese and other relevant provisions in the agreements 
might open the way to and facilitate a revision of the UNSC Resolution 1244 or adopting a 
new one. Following the conclusion of the agreements, the European Council granted Ser-
bia the status of a candidate for EU membership and authorized the opening of negotia-
tions with Kosovo on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). In April 2013 the 
two Prime Ministers Ivica Dačić and Hashim Th aci signed in Brussels the “First Agree-
ment on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations” which was hailed as a his-
toric achievement. It was concluded with the European’s Union facilitation and allowed 
for EU’s further positive steps and relations with both Serbia and Kosovo. However some 
agreed upon solutions of practical problems have not be yet implemented. By 2015 there 
were several positive developments in the normalization process — the conclusion of an 
agreement on judiciary and the fi rst visit in Pristina of the Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica 
Dačić. Th e implementation of the normalization agreements, particularly the establish-
ment of the Community of Serbian municipalities, has been met with considerable resist-
ance on the Kosovar Albanian side and consequently stalled. 
Th e de facto normalized coexistence of Serbia and Kosovo, even without Kosovo’s 
formal recognition by Serbia has already had positive eff ects on the political climate in the 
region. By its reasonable and constructive behaviour the Republic of Serbia has improved 
its standing with the European Union as a candidate country and contributed to the stabil-
ity in the Western Balkans. Th ere was a constructive proposal according to which Serbia 
and Kosovo would regulate their bilateral relations along the model of that between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 
Since 1998: in 1998  the Kosovo issue split the international community, cutting 
across the former East-West divide. It posed a serious challenge to NATO’s inner political 
cohesion and badly worsened relations with the Russian Federation. Th e Alliance was able 
then to bridge the diff erences among its members and to reach a consensus concerning 
the pending military action against FRY and the KFOR’s subsequent deployment since 
1999. Eight years aft er the establishment of international protectorate the problem of Ko-
sovo has again divided the EU and NATO members. In 2008 twenty-two EU and NATO 
Member States recognized Kosovo’s independence. A minority, notably Greece, Cyprus, 
Spain, Slovakia and Romania, have however followed Serbia’s rejectionist position, largely 
for their internal political reasons. On the question of the recognition of Kosovo, Abk-
hazia and Southern Ossetia most EU and NATO member states as well as the Russian 
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Federation have applied double standards honouring the right to self-determination in 
one case and disregarding in the other(s). Since the proclamation of Kosovo’s independ-
ence in February 2008 the Kosovo problem has remained on the agenda of UN Security 
Council, NATO’s North Atlantic Council, the European Union’s Council, the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE.
On September 10, 2012  the International Steering Group for Kosovo offi  cially ter-
minated the supervision of Kosovo’s limited independence and closed the Offi  ce of the 
International Civilian Representative. However these symbolic acts have so far brought 
a limited change in the functioning of the ‘de facto’ international protectorate. Although 
the Kosovar Albanians (supported by the Kosovar Turks and several other smaller eth-
nic groups) achieved, with the West’s direct support, their historical goal of being rid of 
Belgrade’s rule, Kosovo still remains a controversial regional and European problem. Th e 
young and weak semi-independent state will for many years require assistance from the 
international community. 
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